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In the nineteenth century, philosophy was at a crossroads. While the natural and
technical sciences were developing in an unprecedented fashion, philosophy seemed
to be stalled. Inspired by the progress of the natural sciences, many philosophers
attempted to make such progress in philosophy and make philosophy a truly scientifc discipline. This efort was also refected in the philosophy of the LvovWarsaw school. While its founder, Kazimierz Twardowski, following his teacher
Franz Brentano, promoted psychology as a method of scientifc philosophy, one
of his frst students, Jan Łukasiewicz, was convinced that mathematical logic was
such a method. To use mathematical logic as a tool, Łukasiewicz had to, however,
argue convincingly that logic is an independent science and hence is not a part of
psychology, i.e., arguing for anti-psychologism in logic. He initially adopted the
arguments provided by Husserl, then celebrated as a proponent of anti-psychologism, and Frege’s views. When Łukasiewicz developed, however, his systems of
many-valued logic, he denied almost all the principles that characterise Husserl and
Frege’s anti-psychologism, i.e., the objectivity of the laws of logic, the existence of
apodictic propositions, and the distinction between a priori and empirical sciences.
He was, however, a proponent of anti-psychologism up to the end of his life. The
aim of my paper is to introduce Łukasiewicz’s unique concept of anti-psychologism
that signifcantly afected the views of mathematical logic in the Lvov-Warsaw
School, and the views of his colleagues which helped him develop the concept.
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